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COMMENT: 
EXACTLY BACKWARDS: 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
R. Polk Wagner' 
First of all, I want to thank in particular Craig Nard for invit­
ing me to this conference, and to Dan Burk and Mark Lemley for 
embarking upon a very interesting project. 
I 
We meet today in an era of accelerating technological devel­
opment, of the ballooning use of patents as both shields and 
swords in the marketplace, and increasing criticism of the courts' 
ability to meaningfully deal with these changes. Given this, it 
would seem to be the rare and unique patent scholar whose respon­
sive policy prescriptions center around unbounded policy-oriented 
judicial interventions into various details of the patent law. 
Professors Burk and Lemley, however, are such patent schol­
ars. Their basic premise is that the judiciary-in particular the 
Federal Circuit-should embrace and extend a trend towards tech­
nology-specific rules that they argue is a major feature of modern 
patent law. That is, they argue that judicially-created technologi­
cal-exceptionalism-in which every technology, every industry, 
has its own set of rules and procedures, and in which patents are 
evaluated on different bases-will address the challenges of the 
current U.S. patent system. 
I will make three points in this brief response to their pro­
posal. The first two address Burk and Lemley's descriptive claim 
that the patent Jaw is increasingly exhibiting a fundamental tech-
7 Assistant Professor. University of Pennsylvania Law School. Comments appreciated: 
polk@law.upenn.edu. For further research on related subjects. see polk.pennlaw.net/. 
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nological-exceptionalism. That is, I first suggest that this trend is 
counterfactual to the reality of the current patent law. Second, I 
argue that the trend in fact runs counter to some major trends we 
see across the patent law. And finally, I consider the public policy 
questions raised by Burk and Lemley's call for judicially-created 
technological-exceptionalism, concluding that-even assuming 
they are descriptively correct-the dominant approach is exactly 
backwards of the one they advocate. 
I I  
First let's look at whether technological-exceptionalism is 
counterfactual. An initial problem here is that it's really tough to 
figure out what is meant by technology-specific rules. 1 This is 
Professor Janis's point? He says: Of course! The patent laws are 
unquestionably technology-specific. That's by design. That's the 
whole point. The key is, then, to distinguish between two different 
versions of technological-specificity.3 The first I call micro­
exceptionalism, which occurs when the same rules are applied to 
different technological facts and yield different results. This is the 
normal course of things, the way we think of the patent law: gen­
erally uniform rules, applied to very different technological facts, 
mediated by the patent law's ubiquitous "person having ordinary 
skill in the art" standard. 
Although they fail to address the distinction, Professors Burk 
and Lemley discuss a far different form of exceptionalism: macro­
exceptionalism, distinct rules or standards applied to different 
technological facts. This version creates not only technologically­
variable results, but also industry-variable results. Professors 
Burk and Lemley explicitly claim that biotechnology is different 
than software and should be treated differently, and different sorts 
of rules and procedures should thus be developed.4 It's important 
to understand that this is a vision of a very different sort of patent 
law than the micro-exceptionalism that is the conventional under­
standing. One problem with Burk and Lemley's descriptive effort 
1 For more extended arguments on this point, seeR. Polk Wagner, (Mostly) Against Ex­
ceptimwlism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 367 (F. Scott 
Kieff ed., 2003) [hereinafter Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism]; R. Polk Wagner. Of 
Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 1341 
(2003) [hereinafter Wagner, Of Patents & Path Dependency]. 
2 Mark D. Janis, Comment, Equilibrium in a Technologv-Specific Parent System, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743,744 (2004). 
3 This analytic framework was developed in Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism, 
supra note 1, and Wagner, OfPatellls & Path Dependency, supra note l. at 1345-47. 
• Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's UncertaintY Principle. CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 691, 706 (2004 ). 
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is trying to tease out-when you look at the actual cases-what the 
Federal Circuit is doing: Are the judges being macro­
exceptionalists? Are they really trying to do something distinctly 
different, or is this the ordinary run of patent law wherein similar 
rules are applied to different sets of technological facts to yield 
somewhat different results? 
The second consideration, which is a very specific and per­
haps the most original proposal Professors Burk and Lemley make, 
is to vary the person having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSIT A") 
in order to adjust the scope of the claim depending on the particu­
lar technology.5 Table 1 below illustrates this. 
Table 1 
PHOSITA Obviousness Disclosure Scope-Effects 
Scope- Scope-
Effects Effects 
Level Standard Standard (obviousness) 
(disclosure) (equivalents) 
High higher 
lower 
(easy field) (lots of things 
(needn't 
narrower broader indeterminate 
disclose as 
[software] are obvious) 
much) 
Low lower 
higher 
(hard field) (fewer things 
(must disclose 
broader narrower indeterminate 
[biotech] are obvious) 
quite 
specifically) 
The Indeterminate Effects of the PHOSITA Standard 
A serious flaw in this proposal is that the variation of the PHO­
SITA standard has, ultimately, indeterminate effects on patent 
scope. For example, look to the first row in Table 1 above, where 
the PHOSITA standard is high, which means it is a relatively 
"easy" field (e.g., software). The obviousness standard will be 
somewhat higher, because many things are then obvious in that 
field. As a result, the disclosure requirement will be lower. The 
scope effects of the obviousness standard in this case will yield 
narrower patent claims: Because of the amount of obvious infor­
mation, the claim will have to be narrower to avoid the prior art. 
Conversely, the disclosure requirements here will yield broader 
claims: The claim can be broader without disclosing the underly­
ing invention quite as much. The scope effects with respect to 
equivalence, which under the doctrine combines both these effects, 
/d. at 736. 
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are indeterminate.6 Whether a high level or low level of ordinary 
skill in the art ultimately results in broader or narrower patents 
depends on what one thinks about the balance between at least 
these three, and perhaps more, factors. Thus the scope effects of 
varying the PH OS IT A standard are fundamentally indeterminate as 
a general matter, and are likely to be impossible to figure out even 
on a case-by-case basis. Obviously, one can make assumptions 
and try to determine the effects, but I think it is quite troublesome 
to do so. 
Third, there are several alternative explanations for what is 
going on in biotechnology-the field that Burk and Lemley point 
to as the primary example of technological-exceptionalism. 7 For 
instance, one alternative explanation is that the jurisprudential 
dataset is characterized by a very small sample size; there are not 
many cases that deal directly with this. Another alternative expla­
nation is judicial consistency. Shockingly, one judge, Judge 
Lourie, has authored almost all of the major opinions noted by 
Burk and Lemley as relevant to biotechnology; thus, one explana­
tion for the unusual patterns is that 1 udge Lourie could be a very 
consistent judge. 
A third alternative explanation is factual error. Perhaps the 
Federal Circuit is just wrong-Burk and Lemley note this in their 
article, but set it aside as an explanation.8 The Federal Circuit may 
simply be wrong about the ordinary skill in the art level of differ­
ent fields and continue to be wrong. 
A fourth alternative explanation is fact-versus-law confusion. 
The court, at some point, might have said something that was fac­
tually based on biotechnology, or about computer software, and 
now the judges are confused about what is fact and what is law. 
For whatever reason, the court may continue to follow this fact 
that was put in place a long time ago without changing, such that it 
looks like the court is on a macro-exceptionalist mission when, in 
fact it is just confused. 
Importantly, however, each of these explanations suggests 
that any current exceptionalism is extremely unlikely to persist 
(even �lit currently exists). It is not at all clear to me, even if you 
read the cases exactly as Professors Burk and Lemley do, that one 
can determine with any confidence that macro-exceptionalism, as 
opposed to micro-exceptionalism, is developing. 
" For further exposition on this point. see Wagner, Of Patents and Path DependencY, su­
pra note L at 1348-50. 
7 Professors Burk and Lemley identify biotechnology as the primary example of techno­
logical-exception::dism. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 691. 
" !d.at714. 
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III  
The second major concern I have regarding the Burk/Lemley 
thesis is that their argument that technological-specificity is an 
emerging trend in the patent law appears directly counter to clear, 
verifiable jurisprudential trends at the Federal Circuit. 
First, I have done a lot of work recently on claim construc­
tion.9 In their earlier discussions, the judges alluded to some of 
that work. The trend that I find suggests clear movement towards 
rule-based unifvrmity, not standards-based disuniformity. 
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The Federal Circuit's Trend Towards Rules-Based Claim 
Construction10 
In Figure 1 ,  the y-axis represents the frequency of what I call 
the "holistic" methodological approach to claim construction. This 
is a largely standards-based (as opposed to rules-based) approach, 
whereas the alternative approach-"proceduralism"-is far more 
rules-oriented. Figure 1 shows a statistically significant trend over 
time of the Federal Circuit becoming more uniformly rules-based. 
Second, I am involved in another ongoing project analyzing 
all of the Federal Circuit's en bane decisions. It is very interesting 
9 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, ls the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Em­
pirical Assessment of Judicial Perfomzance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004). 
10 This chart is simply one chart from a much larger project. See generallv id. 
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to line up, as I did in Table 2, the last ten years of patent en bane 
decisions. 
Table 2 
Johnson & 
unclaimed does limit Yes 
Johnston equivalents 
Rhone-
2002 Case-specific No 
Poulenc 
Festa 2000 
Case-by-case PHE Rule: complete Yes / 
surrender surrender 
Patent-state law Patent-state law 
Midwest 
1999 
conflicts analyzed conflicts analyzed Yes / 
Industries under regional under Federal 
circuit law Circuit law 
In re Zurko 1998 PTO fact-finding reviewed for clear error No 
Split: limited defer-
Rule: no deference, 
Cybor 1998 ence to district 
pure law issue 
Yes 
courts 
Patent-antitrust Patent-antitrust 
Nobelpharma 1998 
interface decided interface decided Yes 
according to re- according to Fed-
I law eral Circuit law 
Hilton-Davis 1995 DOE issues No 
Rite-Hite 1995 Patent damages issues No 
Split: claim con- Rule: claim con-
Markman 1995 struction as issue Yes 
for· 
In re Alappat 1994 PTO procedures/subject matter No 
In re 
1994 PTO must use 112/6 No 
Donaldson 
Federal Circuit En Bane Trends 
Examination of the cases in which the Federal Circuit court 
has either clarified or changed the law reveals that the court is 
moving towards uniform rules. Table 2 lists the en bane decisions 
in which there is a change-a shift in the doctrinal orientation­
and it demonstrates that the court is moving more towards rules. 
Any artifacts Professors Burk and Lemley pick up that suggest the 
court is moving away from uniformity would be counter to the ac­
tual evidence of a broader project going on at the Federal Circuit 
right now, both in the claim construction area and in a variety of 
other areas as seen through the en bane analysis. 
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This type of data-driven project on en bane procedures sug­
gests that the written description requirement is being targeted. 
The best predictor, when considering all the patent cases going en 
bane, is denials of motions to rehear en bane prior to the case be­
ing taken en bane. Right now we have four judges on record to 
take the written description issue en bane. If you look at this, 
some of the recent major en bane cases suggest that at some point 
this issue is going to be taken en bane. The trend demonstrated in 
Table 2 suggests that the Federal Circuit is not heading in the di­
rection that Professors Burk and Lemley want, but in precisely the 
opposite direction-towards a more rules-based, uniform ap­
proach. 
IV 
Finally, I want to take this opportunity to address some policy 
arguments. Professors Burk and Lemley make the basic point that 
exceptionalism allows for policy-based interventions to ameliorate 
(what they consider to be) industry problems in biotechnology­
overlapping rights and transactions costs. 11 Their solution is to 
adjust the PH OS IT A standard to allow for broader but fewer pat­
ents.12 
As an initial matter, this argument raises a fatal indeterminacy 
problem similar to that which I noted above: Broader patents are 
going to spur more patents, not fewer patents. So it is not clear 
how anyone expects achieve the Burk/Lemley goal of fewer pat­
ents while simultaneously broadening their scope. This apparent 
logical disconnect alone raises troubling questions. 
Second, there are other problems with exceptionalism that 
have already been noted to some degree by other commentators, 
namely the virtually intractable information and game-playing 
problems. We already see this, of course, in patent prosecutors. 
Whenever there is a line drawn, rational patent prosecutors want to 
straddle it; that strategy gives litigators the most flexibility in the 
future. So, because exceptionalism involves the ever more de­
tailed drawing of fine lines, one has to expect an explosion m 
game playing. 
Third, there are issues concerning the political economy of 
specialized patent law. One can imagine the special interest 
groups, the political economy issues that will arise once patent law 
begins to be disaggregated into all its component parts. Obvi­
ously, this will increase complexity and uncertainty enormously. 
11 Burk & Lemley. supra note 4, at 722. 
12 This is the Burk/Lemley punch line for biotechnology. /d. at 737. 
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Claim construction, for example, is a hard issue. After twenty 
years, the Federal Circuit is finally trying to reach some sort of 
common set of rules for claim construction. The prospect of hav­
ing to repeat this process for dozens of legal issues in dozens of 
different technological areas is a deeply troubling aspect of the 
Burk/Lemley proposal. 
Finally, note that the Burk/Lemley scheme is a virtually per­
fect indictment of itself. Their argument is that the Federal Cir­
cuit, by creating an exceptionalist biotechnology jurisprudence, 
has it exactly backwards: narrow and numerous patents causing 
transaction costs. In response, they suggest we ask the Federal 
Circuit to engage in even more open-ended, policy-driven excep­
tionalism. Certainly the evidence to date suggests that this is not 
something the court is going to do well at all. 
Finally, I note that the transaction costs of overlapping rights 
are potential problems not at all unique to biotechnology. One 
could adopt a different approach-clarify the rights-and go ex­
actly the other direction. Instead of being disaggregated and com­
plex, be simple and clear; the initial allocations matter less. Peo­
ple can, in individual industries, tailor their rights with each other 
to deal with these industry-specific issues. A big part of my pro­
posal is the development of uniform, not disaggregated, rules. 
Some of the projects I am working on suggest this is what is going 
on at the Federal Circuit right now-though of course only in fits 
and starts. We are not there yet, and this obviously is not a com­
plete solution. While it may not eliminate costs, it is far more at­
tractive in a sort of second-best world than the exceptionalist ap­
proach. Perhaps most importantly, the suggested solution does not 
depend on the Federal Circuit's ability to develop policy, for 
which the court does not have a good record thus far. 
It may be that the Federal Circuit's trend is in the right direc­
tion and biotechnology jurisprudence is the laggard, not the inno­
vation. In that sense, I would suggest that it is not the Federal Cir­
cuit that has it exactly backwards. 
Thank you. 
